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Abstract
Overindebted private households have created economic and political concern.
Using measures of relative (over-) indebtedness which relate household income
and debt services to di￿erent concepts of subsistence levels, this paper investi-
gates whether severe household indebtedness is driven by trigger events such as
unemployment, childbirth, divorce, or the death of the partner. Exploiting the
panel structure of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the results suggest
that children are likely to cause severe household indebtedness. Unemployment
also worsens the relative debt situation mainly due to the associated income drop.
Strokes of fate have no direct e￿ect but if they come along with changes in house-
hold composition, the associated income shock increases the ￿nancial fragility of
the household. Furthermore, a main determinant of relative overindebtedness is a
home loan which raises doubts about whether families are indeed able to manage
their housing ￿nance.
JEL Classi￿cation: D12, D14, D91
Keywords: household ￿nance, debt, overindebtedness, SOEP
Ruhr Graduate School in Economics (RGS Econ), c/o University of Duisburg-Essen. I am grate-
ful to Reinhold Schnabel, Annika Meng, Alfredo Paloyo, and Hendrik Schmitz for helpful suggestions.
Furthermore, I received valuable comments at the RGS-Workshop at the University Duisburg-Essen,
the 5th International Young Scholar Socio-Economic-Panel Symposium in Delmenhorst, the Scottish
Economic Society Annual Conference 2009 in Perth, the 23rd Annual Conference of the European So-
ciety for Population Economics in Seville, and the Annual Congress 2009 of the Verein f￿r Socialpolitik
in Magdeburg. Financial support by the Ruhr Graduate School in Economics is gratefully acknowl-
edged. All correspondence to Matthias Keese, Ruhr Graduate School in Economics, c/o University of
Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics, Chair of Public Economics (Prof. Dr. Reinhold Schnabel),
45117 Essen, Germany, Email: matthias.keese@uni-due.de.
11 Introduction
While demand for credit and household indebtedness have risen in European countries
in the last decade, the phenomenon of overindebted private households has created eco-
nomic and political concern. In addition, there are households with only little residual
income after paying for their debt service as well as people who perceive their debt
situation as a heavy burden. Remarkably, the scant amount of contributions in this
research ￿eld is conspicuous.
Certainly, debt and overindebtedness are closely related research ￿elds but some
important distinctions have to be made. Indebted households may be behaving ratio-
nally by smoothing consumption over the life cycle. Even a very high debt-to-income
ratio or a high debt burden may re￿ect a strong preference for present consumption
by reducing future consumption or the necessity to deal with severe adverse income
shocks. If the household is still able to ful￿ll the debt obligations and, at the same
time, to maintain a minimum of household expenditure, a high debt burden will not be
worrisome at all, especially if repaying the debt comes along with wealth accumulation
(e.g., for housing). However, even if an overindebted household saves by repaying, say,
building loans, it is worthwile to study its behavior since this household takes the (at
least partly) voluntary decision to consume extremely little in the current period. Since
the household budget already lies below a subsistence level, this household is ￿nancially
fragile. The link to a precarious social status (receipt of public transfers, poverty etc.)
is obvious. This could justify a sociopolitical intervention since indebtedness usually
a￿ects all household members, including children. A direct consequence of overindebt-
edness results from the fact that a large share of debt owed by overindebted persons
is never paid back (including secured debt). This has implications for the institutional
setting, especially on the ￿nancial market.
Descriptive evidence suggests that certain events with an impact on household in-
come and expenditure are likely to trigger overindebtedness (Jentzsch/San JosØ Riestra,
2006; Kempson, 2002; Knobloch et al., 2008). However, econometric analysis on house-
hold indebtedness is still scarce and causalities are not clear. In addition, little is known
about the strength of these events and the question of whether they mainly a￿ect the
household income or the debt burden as well.
This paper investigates the question of whether and to which extent severe household
indebtedness is driven by shocks on income or expenditure or whether household char-
2acteristics are the prevailing factors. I use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
to examine the causal impact of trigger events such as unemployment, strokes of fate
(death of the partner, household breakdown after separation or divorce), changes in
household composition (marriage, cohabitation), and childbirth in a household’s his-
tory on its debt situation. I apply measures of relative (over-) indebtedness (Korczak,
2003). These measures relate household income and debt services to di￿erent concepts
of subsistence level (non-seizable household income and the potential social assistance
level). The measures of indebtedness used show the severity of household indebtedness
and the risk to enter a precarious debt situation: they comprise dichotomous concepts
of overindebtedness as well as debt indicators that include the remainder of the house-
hold income after servicing debt. According to its de￿nition, relative overindebtedness
may arise due to changes in each of its three components, namely income, debt, or
subsistence level. Therefore, I also check to what extent trigger events are likely to
change the debt burden itself or whether the income shock resulting from the trigger
event is the prevailing factor in explaining severe household indebtedness. This is the
￿rst paper that applies econometric methods to this concept.
The paper is structured as follows: the second section reviews the literature regard-
ing overindebtedness and ￿nancial distress with a focus on Germany. The third section
describes the dataset and the applied methodology. Descriptive results are presented
in the fourth section. The ￿fth section shows the results of the econometric analysis.
The sixth section concludes the paper.
2 Literature overview
The literature lacks a uniform de￿nition of overindebtedness. Important approaches
refer to subjective (self-assessed) and to objective overindebtedness. While the former
concept relates to self-assessments of the person concerned, the latter accounts for
household income and expenditure (Korczak, 2003). In the context of the objective
measure, relative overindebtedness refers to a process in which the household still serves
its debt but disposes of a residual income less than the subsistence level before possibly
entering a consumer insolvency regime. In the German case, the applied subsistence
levels are the non-seizable household income and the social assistance level, respectively
(Zimmermann, 2007).
Besides self-assessed overindebtedness or overborrowing, subjective overindebted-
3ness is often measured by statements on di￿culties in repaying debt (Betti et al.,
2007), account overdrafts, the inability to save (Fricke et al., 2007), or the use of debt
counseling (Federal Statistical O￿ce, 2008, Korczak, 2004a,b). Fricke et al. (2007)
use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) of 2005 and, by applying
an ordinary least-squares regression (OLS), they identify age, education and living in
a partnership as a signi￿cantly negative and unemployment as a signi￿cantly positive
determinant of potentially debt-related ￿nancial problems such as a perceived burden
by consumer credit, the inability to pay accommodation costs, the inability to save
or the use of account overdraft (for the latter, only age is signi￿cant). For the EU
countries, Betti et al. (2007) ￿nd that self-assessed overindebtedness (￿di￿culty or
severe di￿culty in making debt payments￿, p. 144) is more frequent among young,
high-income individuals (a rather strange result), and lone parents. 1 In a descriptive
analysis of British households, Kempson (2002) ￿nds self-assessed overborrowing more
frequently among young and single householders, lone parents, tenants, low-incomes,
unemployed and part-time workers, as well as among households who recently expe-
rienced income drops. Using the British Household Panel Survey, Rio/Young (2005b)
use an ordered-probit model and identify the unsecured debt-income ratio, the level of
mortgage income gearing, the level of ￿nancial wealth of households, health, ethnicity
and marital status as the main determinants of self-reported ￿nancial distress. 2 Using a
tobit model, Bridges/Disney (2004) ￿nd that the risk of arrears on debt among British
couples is higher for low-income, younger, and less-educated households as well as for
tenants. Interestingly, they ￿nd a positive in￿uence of wage and employment on arrears
for lone parents, which is probably due to a better credit standing.
Few studies use relative/objective measures to investigate explicit overindebted-
ness. For Germany, Fricke et al. (2004) and Zimmermann (2007) ￿nd that low-income
households are more likely to be overindebted. Knobloch et al. (2008) exploit the (non-
representative) data from the German debt-counselling agencies and ￿nd that the risk
of being overindebted rises with the number of children and unemployment while it is
lower for older people and households with more than one adult. The main triggers for
overindebtedness (reported by debt counselers) are ￿critical events￿ (57 percent) and
1The authors use the European Community Household Panel Survey and the (European) Household
Budget Surveys.
2However, the informational value of these ￿ndings may be questionable. The study uses the
unsecured debt-income ratio, the level of mortgage income gearing and the level of ￿nancial wealth
of households as objective measures for the ￿nancial distress of a household. It is not surprising that
households are able to self-report their objective situation.
4￿avoidable behavior￿ (16 percent, mainly bad ￿nancial management and excessive con-
sumption). According to the Federal Statistical O￿ce (2008), the main (self-assessed)
triggers of severe debt problems are unemployment (29 percent), divorce, death, and the
like (14 percent), illness, addiction, or accident (ten percent), failed self-employment
(ten percent), bad housekeeping (nine percent) and failed home loan ￿nancing (four
percent). Korczak (2004a,b) ￿nds similar results for the clients’ statistics from the year
20023.
There is no contribution in the literature applying econometric analysis to investi-
gate objective/relative overindebtedness as de￿ned above. Instead, overindebtedness is
often proxied, mostly by measures of high debt burdens. Descriptive results for Ger-
many suggest that the debt service as a share of (equivalent) income is higher among
poor households (Knies/Speiss, 2003). In an econometric analysis for Germany, Great
Britain and the US, Brown/Taylor (2008) identify a negative and signi￿cant in￿uence of
age, income and education (the latter only for Great Britain) and a positive and signif-
icant in￿uence of the number of children on the probability to have negative household
wealth as well as a negative and signi￿cant in￿uence of age on the unsecured debt-to-
income ratio. Kempson (2002) ￿nds two main groups which are characterized by high
debt repayments (more than 25% of income), namely low-to middle-income households
with low debt amounts but high repayments (in relation to income) and households
who recently experienced income drops. 4
As for the determinants of debt in Germany, Brown/Taylor (2008) use the SOEP
data and ￿nd that household debt increases with income, household size and is higher if
the head of household is employed while age plays a minor role. For the UK, Rio/Young
(2005a) identify, among others, age with a negative and income with a positive sign as
signi￿cant determinants of unsecured household debt. For Italian households, Magri
(2002) ￿nds a positive correlation of income and debt but a negative in￿uence of income
uncertainty.
3The study by Knobloch et al. only refers to people who are indeed overindebted and relies partly on
statements given by the counselors while the studies by the Federal Statistical O￿ce and Korczak use
information of all debt-counseling clients including self-assessed triggers of overindebtedness. However,
not all clients of debt-counseling agencies are necessarily overindebted.
4There are further empirical contributions dealing with experience from the US and an important
strand of literature on consumer insolvency and bankruptcy (e.g., DeVaney/Hanna, 1994 and 1995;
Fay et al., 2002; Gross/Souleles, 2002). Since the institutional settings of both the ￿nancial market
and the consumer bankruptcy regimes are quite di￿erent, it could be misleading to appropriate the
￿ndings from the US to Germany. Due to the lack of space, I therefore refrain from discussing the US
results and focus on empirical ￿ndings for Germany and other European countries.
5The theoretical propositions of the Permanent Income Hypothesis 5 give several clear
implications: households can be expected to increase their desired debt after a negative
income shock. This shock may result from the death of a partner, divorce, separation,
unemployment, or the birth of a child. In addition, the necessity of buying durable
goods (also housing) after a birth or a household breakdown should have a positive
impact on household debt. The exploitation of economies of scale after marriage or
cohabitation should lower the debt demand of a household. But supply-side factors do
matter as well: households with stability in ￿nancial a￿airs (higher income, marriage,
employment status) should be more likely to obtain a loan or to get favorable credit
terms. This indicates the existence of borrowing constraints for certain households.
In addition, household debt should be higher for younger households according to the
Life-Cycle Hypothesis of saving.
It is arguable whether unexpected income shocks are indeed the main drivers of
severe household indebtedness. Further prominent explanations are moral hazard (due
to consumer insolvency regimes), market failure (information asymmetry between cred-
itors and debitors), myopic behavior, procrastination and hyperbolic discounting (Laib-
son et al., 2000), irrational behavior, excessive preference for present consumption, lack
of ￿nancial or debt literacy (Lusardi/Tufano, 2009) or supply-driven overindebtedness,
e.g., by predatory lending (Kempson, 2002; Stegman/Faris, 2003). As discussed above,
there are correlations between income and debt shocks (trigger events) and overindebt-
edness. In the following, I analyze whether these events indeed have a causal impact
on severe household indebtedness.
3 Dataset description and methodology
I use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to study the debt performance of
German households. The SOEP, located at the DIW Berlin (German Institute of Eco-
nomic Research) started in 1984. Annually, it surveys more than 20,000 individuals in
about 11,000 households6. In addition to relevant information on income components,
socio-demographics and household composition, the SOEP contains information on re-
payments for home loans and consumer credit and on the amount of these monthly
5See e.g. Attanasio (1999), Bertola et al.,(2006), Campbell (2006), and Deaton (1992) for theoretical
aspects of household ￿nance and indebtedness.
6For further details, see Wagner et al. (2007) and the SOEP homepage at
http://www.diw.de/en/soep.
6liabilities7. This information is collected at the household level.
However, the SOEP has a drawback for debt-related research questions: Home loans
and consumer credit form only a part of overall household debt. Private credit, unpaid
tax obligations, payment arrears of rent or alimony as well as outstanding bills of
telephone companies and mail-order houses constitute important sources of household
debt (Angele, 2007). However, due to data limitations, these debt components cannot
be taken into account. A further limitation lies in the fact that overindebted households
may have announced their insolvency (and household members may have entered the
private insolvency proceedings) or stopped repaying debt. These households would
not be identi￿ed as being overindebted. It could also happen that people are not
completely aware of their amount of debt burden and, in addition, underestimate the
monthly repayment (e.g. interest payments due to account overdrafts).
To examine the severity of a household’s indebtedness, I apply the measures of rela-
tive overindebtedness mentioned above. I proceed in the following way: for each house-
hold, I calculate the income after debt repayments, the non-seizable income 8, and the
potential social assistance level that a household would have obtained in the respective
year9. The non-seizable household income is notably higher than the social-assistance
level. Using the household income, the debt burden and the di￿erent subsistence lev-
els of a certain household, I create the measures of a household’s debt performance
displayed in Table 1.
The measure OI1 indicates whether a household is overindebted, namely whether its
7The exact wording of the questions is the following: ￿Do you still have ￿nancial obligations, for
example loans or a mortgage, for this house or ￿at in which you live?￿ (yes/no); ￿How high are the
monthly loan or mortgage payments including interest for this loan or mortgage?￿ (euros per month);
￿Aside from debts on loans for home and property ownership, are you currently paying back loans and
interest on loans that you took out to make large purchases or other expenditures?￿ (yes/no); ￿How
high is the monthly rate that you pay on these loans?￿ (euros per month).
8I compute the non-seizable income by using the attachment tables to ￿850c Zivilprozessordnung
(Code of Civil Procedure) that were valid in the respective year accounting for the number of household
members liable for support and for non-seizable social transfers (e.g. child allowances). For details,
see Federal Ministry of Justice (2007).
9My calculation is in line with the legal basis of the social assistance in Germany (Zw￿lftes Sozialge-
setzbuch, XII Social welfare statute book). An important piece of information is household size as
well as on the number and age of the children. The head of the household receives a standard rate
according to the legislation in the respective year, the additional household members receive a percent-
age share of the standard rate. I add lease and heating costs based on average housing expenditure
for the recipients of social assistance. Additional requirements for needy or elderly people as well as
for lone parents are taken into account. Since the system of social assistance changed in 2005, I add
lump-sum single payments to calculate the social assistance for the years before in order to ensure
comparability. To follow the methodology to compute the potential social-assistance level in detail,
refer to the publications edited by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social A￿airs (2008a,b,c,d).
7Table 1. Measures of overindebtedness and debt performance
Measures of overindebtedness
Overindebted1 (OI1) Household income minus debt service < Non-seizable income
Overindebted2 (OI2)
Household income minus debt service < Social assistance level
& Debt service > 0
Measures of debt performance
Debt performance (DP1) (Income minus debt service) / Non-seizable income
Debt performance (DP2) (Income minus debt service) / Social assistance level
Source: Own illustration.
income after repaying debt lies below the non-seizable income. OI2 shows whether the
household income after debt repayments lies below the potential social-assistance level.
Since the household income may be less than the social-assistance level, households
could be overindebted without having debt. I therefore use the measure OI2 to de￿ne
households as being overindebted only if they have debt obligations.
In addition to the dichotomous measures of overindebtedness, I use the measures
of debt performance DP1 and DP2 to indicate the ￿nancial fragility of a household.
These measures show the distance of a household between current income after debt
repayments and the subsistence level as well as its closeness to a situation of overindebt-
edness. DP1 indicates the distance between the household income (after debt payments)
and the non-seizable income; DP2 shows the same for the social-assistance level. For
example, a DP2 of 200 percent means that the household income minus monthly debt
service is twice the amount of the potential social-assistance level of this household.
To examine whether certain adverse shocks to the household budget are triggers for
severe household indebtedness, household events are included as explanatory variables
in the later regressions, namely marriage, cohabitation, childbirth, separation, divorce,
and death of a partner. Since the number of observations is very small for some of these
events, I aggregate household changes for which I expect the same sign of impact on
the debt performance of the household: death, divorce and separation form the variable
stroke since all three events can be assumed to have a strong negative impact on the
debt situation of a household. Death comes along with high expenses (e.g., funeral)
and, possibly, income losses if the breadwinner dies. Separation and divorce lead to
income losses and higher expenditure due to unrealized economies of scale.
As already discussed in the introduction, there are three channels for overindebt-
8edness to evolve. In addition to income and debt, one has to consider the changes
in subsistence level resulting from household events as well. However, the direction
is the same for all single events that form the variable stroke: both the non-seizable
income and the social assistance level decline if the event comes along with a reduction
in household size (for divorce and separation, the number of household members must
not necessarily go down). Therefore, a case of death may even lead to a relaxation
of the debt performance, even if the debt obligation of the deceased persists for the
remaining household members: If the dead person was not an earner, the household
income stays constant but the potential subsistence level declines. Thus, the di￿erence
between current income after debt repayments and subsistence levels increases.
In case of cohabitation or marriage, I expect a positive impact on income and
expenditure due to bene￿ts from pooled household expenditure or joint tax assessment.
Both events form the joint variable household change. However, debt could rise if new
loans (e.g., for durable household appliances) would dominate the e￿ect resulting from
the increased income. Furthermore, the subsistence level rises if the household size
increases. This could put more tension on the relative debt situation.
To sum up, the interplay of the single e￿ects (income, debt, and subsistence level)
makes it rather complicated to guess the impact of the trigger events on the relative
debt situation of a household beforehand. Though, the single e￿ects for the events
aggregated in the variables stroke and household change are likely to work in the same
direction.
In addition to stroke and household change, I also include an indicator of whether
the head of household experienced a job loss in the previous year (variable job loss)
and whether a child was born in the household (childbirth). Since both events generally
lead to a reduction in income (and the birth of a child to an increase in expenditure),
I expect a negative impact on the debt performance of these occurrences. Again, the
overall e￿ect is more complicated. Unemployment could raise demand (but not supply)
of debt, the subsistence level (non-seizable income) is negatively a￿ected. A newborn
can be expected to increase a household’s debt demand. At the same time, both
potential subsistence levels rise with the additional child.
To create the sample, I keep observations with valid statements on the relevant
household characteristics, income, and debt components. Furthermore, I do not use
observations with more than two adults in a household since I cannot assume that
households with more than two adult members have a joint budget and, therefore, a
9joint debt situation. The generated sample includes 5,378 observations at the household
level with the respective characteristics of the head of household per year (2002￿2007).
4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the generated sample. Over time, the house-
hold size and the average number of children slightly increase. The mean income of the
household, its calculated non-seizable income and the calculated social-assistance level
also rise each year (but small drop for the latter in 2005).
Table 2. Sample composition
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Household size 1.98 2.00 2.02 2.04 2.04 2.05
Number of children 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.41
Household income (monthly) 2,463 2,462 2,496 2,511 2,546 2,565
Calculated social assistance level 1,035 1,062 1,077 1,052 1,061 1,086
Calculated non-seizable income 1,626 1,652 1,665 1,717 1,720 1,738
Credit 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.15
Home loan 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21
Debt service 184 205 211 188 186 196
Homeowner 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47
Stroke* 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Household change* 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Childbirth * 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Unemployment shock* 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Age 51.6 52.6 53.5 54.5 55.5 56.4
Full employed head of household 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37
Unemployed head of household 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Pensioner 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.46
Female 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42
Observations 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378
*These variables refer to events in the previous twelve months. Source: Own illustration.
SOEP data 2002￿2007. In 2007, the sample represented about 15.8 millions of households.
10Table 3. Overindebtedness and debt performance of the full sample and subgroups




OI1 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.36
OI2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.14
DP1 1.32 1.14 1.19 1.35 1.14
DP2 2.21 1.71 1.97 2.44 1.77
Credit 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.23
Home loan 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.36
Total debt service 196 186 185 259 438
Source: Own calculations using the SOEP data. Year: 2007.
Consumer credit has a peak in 2004 with a share of more than 21 percent of all
households in the sample repaying this type of debt. The number of households with
home loans increases from about 18 percent in 2002 to more than 21 percent in 2007.
In all periods, more than 40 percent of the sampled households own the house or ￿at
they live in.
The variables stroke, household change, job loss, and childbirth refer to the respective
events in the previous 12 months. The number of observations is relatively small for
all events. About four percent of all households experienced a stroke (such as death,
divorce, or separation in the last year) or a household change (marriage or cohabitation)
in 2002. The share of both variables halves over time. The number of households with
a newborn lies between two and three percent in each period. About six percent of
all households have an unemployed household head while in two to four percent of all
households in the sample, the head of household experienced a job loss in the previous
12 months.
Table 3 displays the debt performance of di￿erent subgroups of the sample for the
year 2007. The probability of being overindebted (OI1) is higher for households if the
head of household became unemployed in the previous year, as well as after a childbirth
(OI1 and OI2). The same is true for the debt performance. Both debt indicators (DP1
and DP2) are lower for the mentioned household types. In contrast, overindebtedness
is widespread in almost the same manner among households who recently experienced a
stroke or a household change. The debt performance of these households is not notably
di￿erent from the whole sample. The share of households with a home loan is also not
11quite di￿erent between the whole sample and the subsamples job loss and stroke but
notably higher for childbirth and somewhat lower for household change while the share
of households with consumer credit is much higher among all subsamples. The total
debt service is on average similar for the whole sample and household who experienced
a job loss and a stroke, but the subsamples household change and childbirth have on
average much higher monthly debt repayments.
These ￿ndings suggest correlations between unemployment and a recently born baby
on the one hand and a situation of severe indebtedness on the other hand. For house-
holds su￿ering from unemployment, the debt burden itself does not seem to be the main
driver while households with a newborn show indeed a notably higher debt burden. In
contrast, the similiarities of the debt situation of the full sample and the households
with a stroke or a household change event are not straightforward. Possibly, these
events only show an impact on the debt situation after a certain period of time, even if
these households use consumer credit more often.
5 Empirical strategy and results
5.1 Methodology
The descriptive results indicate correlations between household changes and strokes of
fate on the one hand and the objective debt situation of the household on the other
hand. Under certain assumption, panel regression analysis shows the impact of these
events on severe household indebtedness. One crucial assumption is that the household
events under investigation such as stroke, household change, childbirth, and job loss are
exogeneous with respect to the debt situation of the household conditional on other
covariates.
I analyze overindebtedness and the debt performance of the households in the sample
(Section 5.2). The dependent variables are the dichotomous measures of overindebt-
edness as well as the continuous indicators of the debt performance for both concepts
of subsistence level mentioned above. In addition to the household events, I include
several control variables that indicate the economic situation of the household (home
ownership and outstanding home loan), the household composition (number of children
and adults) and the characteristics of the household head (employment status such
as white collar, civil servant, full employment, etc., education such as university en-
12trance quali￿cation and university degree, as well as socio-demographic characteristics
such as gender, lone parenthood, and migrant). Furthermore, I include the dummies
home loan and homeowner in the regression to account for the di￿erent debt situation
of homeowners and tenants (compare to Bridges/Disney, 2004, who also control for
homeownership). The argument that (secured) housing debt is less worrying than (un-
secured) debt resulting from consumer credit may be brought forward. This is because
repayments of housing debt are a type of asset accumulation (when subtracting the
interest payments) while high repayments for consumer credit could be an expression
of potential bad ￿nancial management. Nevertheless, the result is quite similar: due
to their debt burden, these households have an income that lies below the subsistence
level. These households are classi￿ed as ￿nancially fragile. Repayments for home loans
are indeed problematic if the remaining household budget is less than needed for basic
expenditures.
Subsequently (Section 5.3), I focus on the households’ debt burdens. As discussed
above, the composed measures of overindebtedness and the debt performance include
the household income, the debt service, and a subsistence level. Severe household
indebtedness may therefore be caused by several channels:
First, a certain trigger event may constitute before all an income shock while the
debt burden itself stays constant. Second, the household debt may increase or decrease
in response to the event. Since the e￿ective debt burden of a household is in￿uenced
by debt demand and supply, both directions are possible: a household’s debt demand
may increase after a shock but the debt supplier may reject this request with a higher
probability. Third, the subsistence level changes with the number of household members
and the household income (non-seizable income).
To distinguish the impact of the three channels, I analyze how a household’s debt
burdens evolves in response to di￿erent trigger events. The three relevant dependent
variables are consumer credit and home loan (binary variables that indicate whether
a household repays the respective debt type) and the total debt service of a house-
hold. Trigger events may have a direct in￿uence on the debt burden of a household
(e.g., increasing expenditures after a birth or missing credit standing after becoming
unemployed) but also an indirect e￿ect via the household income since trigger events
constitute an income shock. In addition, the income level itself may in￿uence the debt
situation of a household. Therefore, I disentangle the single e￿ects by looking at the
impact of possible trigger events on household debt and, subsequently, on the household
13Table 4. Regression results: overindebtedness and debt performance
OI1 OI2 DP1 DP2
Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Number of 0.660*** 0.872*** 0.323** 0.606*** -0.064** -0.097*** -0.197*** -0.306***
children (0.106) (0.0778) (0.138) (0.0783) (0.0266) (0.0107) (0.0506) (0.0211)
Number of -0.00420 0.0524 0.0062 -0.528*** -0.0078 0.0360** -0.0101 0.0901*
adults (0.160) (0.133) (0.247) (0.176) (0.0319) (0.0179) (0.0648) (0.0464)
Unemployed 0.463*** 0.771*** 0.471** 0.834*** -0.062*** -0.072*** -0.099*** -0.118***
(0.162) (0.154) (0.209) (0.189) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0350) (0.0292)
Job loss 0.477*** 0.459*** 0.411** 0.352** -0.00734 -0.00708 0.0119 0.0368
last year (0.157) (0.165) (0.162) (0.172) (0.0160) (0.0148) (0.0339) (0.0354)
Stroke 0.0648 0.147 0.252 0.246 -0.0391** -0.0153 -0.0732** -0.0124
(0.194) (0.196) (0.238) (0.235) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0367) (0.0360)
Household -0.0585 -0.228 0.121 0.132 0.0625 0.0560 0.129 0.114
change (0.150) (0.171) (0.289) (0.266) (0.0498) (0.0527) (0.102) (0.103)
Childbirth 0.572*** 0.428*** 1.054*** 0.779*** -0.057*** -0.040*** -0.228*** -0.151***
(0.145) (0.149) (0.198) (0.209) (0.0132) (0.0117) (0.0286) (0.0262)
Homeowner 0.388 -0.811*** 0.338 -0.584** 0.0437 0.142*** 0.157 0.341***
(0.287) (0.193) (0.381) (0.244) (0.0497) (0.0365) (0.0965) (0.0660)
Home loan 3.386*** 5.250*** 2.675*** 3.827*** -0.294*** -0.314*** -0.528*** -0.529***
(0.226) (0.220) (0.338) (0.245) (0.0344) (0.0276) (0.0681) (0.0522)
Observations 8,088 32,268 3,642 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268
Fixed-e￿ects and random-e￿ects panel regression. Selected coe￿cients. Source: SOEP: 2002￿2007.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 repetitions). * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01.
income.
I run ￿xed-e￿ects and random-e￿ects panel regressions. Since the within-variance is
quite small for certain control variables (e.g., gender of the head of household, migrant),
I exclude some explanatory variables from the ￿xed-e￿ects regression that are mostly
time-invariant.
5.2 Overindebtedness and debt performance
Table 4 displays the coe￿cient estimates for both overindebtedness (logit model) and
the debt performance (OLS) for the most relevant explanatory variables. A complete
list of coe￿cients for all control variables is included in the appendix.
In the ￿xed-e￿ects regressions, stroke and household change do not have a signi￿cant
14in￿uence on the probability of becoming overindebted. Since the number of adult
household members does not increase the risk of being overindebted, neither a direct
nor an indirect e￿ect is detectable. Unemployment a￿ects overindebtedness in two ways:
a job loss in the previous year as well as persistent unemployment have a signi￿cantly
positive in￿uence on OI1 and OI2. In a similar way, a newborn constitutes a risk factor
for a precarious debt situation: the coe￿cient of childbirth is signi￿cantly positive in the
OI1 and OI2 regressions but requires a joint interpretation with the number of children
in the household. Therefore, a birth aggravates the positive e￿ect of the number of
children in the household on the likelihood of being overindebted. The coe￿cient of the
dummy home loan is signi￿cantly positive and quite large implying that a home loan
is a main determinant of overindebtedness.
The random-e￿ects regressions results yield similar ￿ndings: Unemployment and
children signi￿cantly increase a household’s risk to become overindebted while strokes of
fate and changes in household composition have no signi￿cant e￿ect, with one exception:
the probability of OI2 signi￿cantly falls with the number of adult household members.
To quantify the impact of a trigger event on overindebtedness, Table 5 shows the
average marginal e￿ects of the explanatory variables (random e￿ects). 10 The size of the
aggregated e￿ect for unemployment (job loss in the last year and current unemploy-
ment) is about six percentage points (OI1) while the unemployment shock itself does
not have any in￿uence on OI2 (in contrast, persistent unemployment does in a minor
way). If an adult leaves the household, the risk of being overindebted declines by about
a half percentage point (OI2). Thus, stroke and household change have no direct but an
(economically small) indirect impact on overindebtedness. A birth increases the risk of
being overindebted (OI1) by about six percentage points, for OI2 the increase is about
three percentage points (again, since a newborn generally rises the number of children
in the household, both e￿ects have to be taken together).
10For comparison, I also run ￿xed-e￿ects and random-e￿ects regressions applying a linear proba-
bility model (with marginal e￿ects which equal the regression coe￿cients). The impact of children,
unemployement, and real estate ￿nancing is con￿rmed in both the ￿xed-e￿ects and random-e￿ects
speci￿cations: childbirth: between three and six percentage points; number of children: eight (OI1)
and two (OI2) percentage points; job loss: two to four percentage points; unemployment: three to ￿ve
percentage points; home loan: more than 30 (OI1) and ten (OI2) percentage points.
15Table 5. Marginal e￿ects for overindebtedness
OI1 OI2
(non-seizable income) (social assistance)
Number of 0.043*** 0.009***
children (0.006) (0.002)




Job loss 0.021*** 0.005









Home loan 0.402*** 0.078***
(0.037) (0.018)
Random-e￿ects panel regression. Source: SOEP: 2002￿2007
* p < 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The marginal e￿ect of a home loan is very large. Taking out this type of debt boosts
the risk of overindebtedness by 40 or eight percentage points, respectively. However,
the e￿ect of becoming a homeowner diminishes the impact of a home loan a little (three
percentage points or about one percentage point, respectively). 11
As expected, the ￿ndings are similar for the debt performance of a household (Table
4). With an increasing DP1 and DP2, a household augments the di￿erencce between its
current income after repaying debt and the subsistence level. Therefore, an opposite sign
for the coe￿cients (compared to the overindebtedness regressions) can be expected. A
positive coe￿cient indicates a relaxation of the debt situation. The number of children
and a birth signi￿cantly worsen the debt performance; the same is true for ongoing
unemployment (not for a job loss in the previous year) and a home loan. Furthermore,
11When excluding ’home loan’ from the regression, the dummy of ’homeowner’ absorbs a large
share of the e￿ect resulting from housing debt. I also run regressions excluding both ’home loan’ and
’homeowner’. In all cases, the impact of the control variables of interest is basically unchanged.
16a stroke of fate signi￿cantly worsens the debt performance of a household (￿xed-e￿ects
regressions) but does not trigger overindebtedness.
One additional point is that severe household indebtedness seems to be a major
problem for younger households: In all random-e￿ects regressions, the coe￿cient of
age is signi￿cant and indicates that both the risk of being overindebted and the debt
performance improve over the life cycle (see results in the appendix).
5.3 Household debt and income
The results of the debt and income regressions are displayed in Table 6. To begin with,
I discuss the impact of children on household debt: After a childbirth, the probability
of having consumer credit increases signi￿cantly while the number of children has no
signi￿cant impact. In addition, the probability of having a home loan rises with the
number of children in the household but a newborn lowers this e￿ect. 12 Both ￿ndings
indicate that the debt burden rises with a further child in the household, although
only to a minor extent since the total debt service increases by only 40 euros (in the
￿xed-e￿ects model).
Households a￿ected by a job loss of the household head increase their probability
for consumer credit (however, the evidence is only weak in the ￿xed-e￿ects regression).
The total debt service is not a￿ected. In contrast, the coe￿cients of ’unemployed’ are
insigni￿cant in the ￿xed-e￿ects regressions. This shows that households a￿ected by job
loss are likely to rely on consumer credit to smooth consumption over the unemploy-
ment period (the supply side does not seem to make an issue with the lost job) but only
in the short term.13 Persistent unemployment does not in￿uence debt, be it because the
households do not demand further debt or because the credit rating decreases such that
creditors refuse loan applications more frequently. As for stroke and household change,
the coe￿cients are mostly insigni￿cant. However, the probability of having a home
loan rises with the number of adult household members but this e￿ect weakens due to
the signi￿cantly negative coe￿cient of ’household change’ and the marginal e￿ects are
economically irrelevant. Similarly, a further adult in the household does not lead to an
increase in the debt service.
12Taking both e￿ects together (childbirth and number of children), the probability of having a certain
type of debt with a newborn baby rises by about two and ￿ve percentage points for consumer credit
and home loan, respectively, using the random-e￿ects model.
13And to a minor extent: the marginal e￿ect (random-e￿ects model) is only about two percentage
points.
17Table 6. Regression results: debt determinants and household income
Consumer credit Home loan Debt service Household
income
Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Income in 0.532*** 0.473*** 0.625*** 1.557*** 0.0874*** 0.146***
1,000 euros (0.0991) (0.0833) (0.207) (0.179) (0.0148) (0.0182)
Number of -0.171 -0.0575 2.480*** 2.691*** 0.0815*** 0.109*** 0.0875*** 0.0780***
children (0.105) (0.0568) (0.314) (0.179) (0.0132) (0.00883) (0.0102) (0.00660)
Number of 0.0503 0.336*** 0.723** 0.627** 0.00434 -0.0165 0.454*** 0.510***
adults (0.147) (0.112) (0.300) (0.252) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0123)
Unemployed 0.00272 0.173 0.170 0.306 0.00773 0.0169** -0.089*** -0.103***
(0.125) (0.131) (0.327) (0.311) (0.00749) (0.00764) (0.0130) (0.0132)
Job loss 0.213* 0.310** -0.121 0.00821 0.0102 0.0118 0.0110 0.0286**
last year (0.123) (0.126) (0.288) (0.246) (0.00793) (0.00877) (0.0109) (0.0113)
Stroke -0.0776 0.0977 0.166 0.487* -0.00106 0.0125 -0.0212* -0.00183
(0.139) (0.150) (0.260) (0.252) (0.00802) (0.00851) (0.0122) (0.0114)
Household 0.0838 -0.00668 -0.444** -0.632*** 0.00247 -0.00811 0.0139 0.00516
change (0.111) (0.107) (0.179) (0.229) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0112) (0.0113)
Childbirth 0.360*** 0.274** -1.235*** -1.173*** -0.0379** -0.042*** -0.080*** -0.061***
(0.138) (0.132) (0.229) (0.210) (0.0155) (0.0144) (0.0102) (0.0103)
Observations 10,944 32,268 4,908 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268
Source: SOEP: 2002￿2007. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 repetitions).
* p < 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Even if a household’s debt service stays constant, an income drop worsens the relative
debt situation and may trigger a situation of overindebtedness. The regression results
are also displayed in Table 6. The income rises signi￿cantly with the number of chil-
dren in the household. However, this e￿ect is nearly compensated after the birth of a
child. All in all, a further child does not drastically reduce the household income. In
contrast, the coe￿cient for the number of adults is signi￿cantly positive and economi-
cally large. This indicates a strong negative income shock if an adult person leaves the
household (be it due to death, separation, or divorce). Similarly, the household income
jumps up after a change in household composition associated with an increase in adult
household members (cohabitation or marriage). As expected, unemployment reduces
the household income. A recent job loss (with later reemployment) has no signi￿cant
18e￿ect on the household income such that a severe indebtedness via the income channel
is only likely to occur in case of persistent unemployment. Furthermore, the coe￿cient
of stroke is weakly signi￿cant and negative in the ￿xed-e￿ects regression implying that
divorce, separation, or death of the partner is followed by an income shock that may
even reinforce the income drop associated with the loss of an adult household member.
Furthermore, the debt regression results in Table 6 show that the household income
has a signi￿cantly positive impact on both debt types (consumer credit and home loans)
and the total debt service. Therefore, a decreasing household income tends to alleviate
the debt situation of the household. In particular, the loss of an adult household
member has a large (negative) e￿ect on the household income such that the burden
associated with debt repayments declines while, in contrast, a further adult entering
the household is likely to increase the household income as well as the debt service. 14
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of trigger events such as strokes of fate (death,
separation, or divorce), change in household composition (cohabitation or marriage),
unemployment, and childbirth on the debt situation of a household. For every house-
hold, several measures of relative/objective overindebtedness and debt performance
have been created. These measures compare the household income after debt repay-
ments to di￿erent concepts of subsistence levels and indicate a possible overindebtedness
as well as the ￿nancial vulnerability of a household. Descriptive statistics of SOEP data
from 2002￿2007 show that unemployment of the head of household and childbirth seem
to worsen the debt situation considerably while the risk of being overindebted and the
debt performance are not notably di￿erent for households after loss of the partner (due
to separation, divorce, or death), cohabitation or marriage compared to the whole sam-
ple. The monthly debt service of households with a birth in the previous twelve months
is much higher than the debt burdens of other households.
First, panel-regression analysis has focussed on overindebtedness and the debt per-
14Excluding the household income from the debt service regressions yields signi￿cantly positive
coe￿cients for the number of adults. A further household member (a child or an adult) increases
the monthly debt repayment by about 40 euros (￿xed e￿ects). The e￿ects of unemployment are also
robust: a job loss in the previous year has a small impact on the probability of consumer credit while
there is no signi￿cant e￿ect of unemployment (be it temporary or persistent) on the total debt service.
19formance of private households. Second, since the applied measures of relative (over-
)indebtedness comprise income, debt service, and subsistence level, the in￿uence of the
single channels has been investigated to answer the question of whether severe indebt-
edness is primarily triggered by an income shock or whether it is a rise in the debt
burden or an increase in the subsistence level that worsens the relative debt situation
of a household.
My analysis has several ￿ndings: ￿rst, childbirth and the number of children have a
signi￿cant impact on both increasing the risk of becoming overindebted and worsening
a household’s debt performance. My interpretation is that the main reasons to cause
a situation of severe indebtedness after a childbirth are increases of the debt burden
(home loan) and the subsistence level, while I do not ￿nd evidence for an income shock
resulting from a newborn. Second, unemployment is also a trigger event for severe
household indebtedness. However, the operating channel is di￿erent: the income shock
associated with persistent unemployment plays the main role to worsen the measures
of indebtedness while there is only a minor impact of unemployment on debt itself
(consumer credit) and on the subsistence level. If the head of household is reemployed
shortly after the job loss, there is no signi￿cant impact on the household income but
on the probability of having consumer credit. The probability of being overindebted
will increase signi￿cantly if the head of household has experienced a job loss in the
last year but works again at the point of the interview. Third, the picture is more
complicated for strokes of fate and changes in household composition. Both events do
not show signi￿cant own e￿ects on the risk of being overindebted, the debt performance,
but some (economically small) impact on the probability of having a certain type of
household debt and the debt amount. However, the number of adults in the household
has a signi￿cant in￿uence on the severity of household indebtedness only in the random-
e￿ects regressions such that there is only weak evidence for severe indebtedness caused
by a stroke of fate. Several e￿ects work against each other. If an adult leaves the
household, the income drastically declines. At the same time, the potential subsistence
level goes down. The latter e￿ect attenuates the former one. The income drop resulting
from the vanished adult household member rather mitigates the debt burden while the
direct e￿ect on the total debt service goes the opposite way. All in all, both e￿ects
cancel each other out. The same is true, with opposite signs, for change if this event is
associated with an additional adult moving in the household.
My ￿ndings have several policy implications to tackle relative overindebtedness: as
20for families, the main goal is to achieve an income that exceeds the increase in the
subsistence level and that enables the household to handle a rising debt burden (home
loans). Important ￿elds of action would be childcare policies and employment incentives
for both spouses. Regarding unemployment as well as strokes of fate, income stability
is a central issue since the associated income shock constitutes a main threat to the
household budget. Relative overindebtedness may be reduced by keeping unemployment
spells shortly and by ￿nding employment possibilities for people who have lost their
partner.
One general remark is further mentionable: Even if severe indebtedness is triggered
by a negative income shock or by an uncompensated rise in the subsistence level while
the debt service itself stays constant, the household must have been indebted in some
way before the event occurred. Given the ￿ndings of this paper, it may be doubtful
that households are indeed able to manage their housing ￿nance. The results show that
a main reason for overindebtedness is simply a home loan. However, even if the debt
burden has been manageable quite well before a possible trigger event occurred, one
may re￿ect on the question of whether the forecast of trigger events has been adequate
on both the demand and the supply side of the debt market.
Further research is needed to get more insights into the ￿eld of household debt. First,
empirical evidence on debt persistence is desirable. Debt does not disappear after a
short time. Therefore, it could be quite interesting to understand how a household’s
debt burden evolves over time and how it adjusts due to household characteristics and
certain trigger events. Second, data limitations are still a hurdle for empirical research
on debt. A notable part of household debt is not covered; several important aspects
(e.g., consumer insolvency) cannot be taken into account.
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Household 0.532*** 0.625*** 0.0874***
income1 (0.0991) (0.207) (0.0148)
Number of 0.660*** 0.323** -0.064** -0.197*** -0.171 2.480*** 0.0815*** 0.0875***
children (0.106) (0.138) (0.0266) (0.0506) (0.105) (0.314) (0.0132) (0.0102)
Number of -0.00420 0.00615 -0.00782 -0.0101 0.0503 0.723** 0.00434 0.454***
adults (0.160) (0.247) (0.0319) (0.0648) (0.147) (0.300) (0.0111) (0.0124)
Full -0.242 -0.854*** 0.122*** 0.385*** 0.453*** 0.601*** 0.0386*** 0.184***
employment (0.153) (0.204) (0.0192) (0.0403) (0.108) (0.224) (0.00819) (0.0119)
Unemployed 0.463*** 0.471** -0.062*** -0.099*** 0.00272 0.170 0.00773 -0.089***
(0.162) (0.209) (0.0136) (0.0350) (0.125) (0.327) (0.00749) (0.0130)
Job loss 0.477*** 0.411** -0.00734 0.0119 0.213* -0.121 0.0102 0.0110
last year (0.157) (0.162) (0.0160) (0.0339) (0.123) (0.288) (0.00793) (0.0109)
Stroke 0.0648 0.252 -0.0391** -0.0732** -0.0776 0.166 -0.00106 -0.0212*
(0.194) (0.238) (0.0154) (0.0367) (0.139) (0.260) (0.00802) (0.0122)
Household -0.0585 0.121 0.0625 0.129 0.0838 -0.444** 0.00247 0.0139
change (0.150) (0.289) (0.0498) (0.102) (0.111) (0.179) (0.0116) (0.0112)
Childbirth 0.572*** 1.054*** -0.057*** -0.228*** 0.360*** -1.235*** -0.0379** -0.080***
(0.145) (0.198) (0.0132) (0.0286) (0.138) (0.229) (0.0155) (0.0102)
Homeowner 0.388 0.338 0.0437 0.157
(0.287) (0.381) (0.0497) (0.0965)
Home 3.386*** 2.675*** -0.294*** -0.528***
loan (0.226) (0.338) (0.0344) (0.0681)





Wald 2 708.51 170.27 578.35 650.47 76.19 110.21 128.47 1,917.18
Observations 8,088 3,642 32,268 32,268 10,944 4,908 32,268 32,268
Households 1,348 607 5,378 5,378 1,824 818 5,378 5,378
1De￿ated household income (log) 2Total monthly debt service in thousand euros. Source: SOEP: 2002￿2007.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 repetitions). * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01.















Household 0.473*** 1.557*** 0.146***
income1 (0.0833) (0.179) (0.0182)
Number of 0.872*** 0.606*** -0.097*** -0.306*** -0.0575 2.691*** 0.109*** 0.0780***
children (0.0778) (0.0783) (0.0107) (0.0211) (0.0568) (0.179) (0.00883) (0.00660)
Number of 0.0524 -0.528*** 0.0360** 0.0901* 0.336*** 0.627** -0.0165 0.510***
adults (0.133) (0.176) (0.0179) (0.0464) (0.112) (0.252) (0.0109) (0.0123)
Self- -0.395* -0.0293 0.269*** 0.677*** 0.316* 1.070*** 0.0355* 0.174***
employed (0.216) (0.273) (0.0576) (0.113) (0.164) (0.313) (0.0207) (0.0182)
Whitecollar -0.225 -0.993*** 0.0094 0.143*** 0.278** 0.750*** 0.0276** 0.114***
(0.137) (0.208) (0.0222) (0.0542) (0.114) (0.213) (0.0111) (0.0109)
Bluecollar 0.296** -0.304 -0.052*** -0.0162 0.554*** 0.429* 0.00398 0.0599***
(0.146) (0.190) (0.0170) (0.0403) (0.122) (0.256) (0.00859) (0.0109)
Civil -1.687*** -2.485*** 0.0702** 0.298*** 0.560** 1.406*** 0.0672** 0.163***
servant (0.299) (0.666) (0.0358) (0.0799) (0.224) (0.452) (0.0267) (0.0230)
Univ. entr. -1.194*** -0.802*** 0.264*** 0.649*** -0.706*** 0.0101 0.00988 0.187***
qualifcation (0.171) (0.198) (0.0510) (0.107) (0.152) (0.322) (0.0118) (0.0170)
University -1.115*** -0.768*** 0.230*** 0.581*** -0.0826 0.238 -0.00732 0.234***
degree (0.181) (0.237) (0.0447) (0.0911) (0.149) (0.298) (0.0126) (0.0179)
Age -0.073*** -0.060*** 0.0031*** 0.0063*** -0.081*** -0.0051 -0.002*** 0.00228***
(0.00523) (0.00649) (0.000621) (0.00125) (0.00358) (0.00685) (0.000367) (0.000390)
Female -0.015 -0.235 -0.057*** -0.115** -0.113 -0.487** -0.0163* -0.040***
(0.129) (0.159) (0.0218) (0.0509) (0.0987) (0.248) (0.00906) (0.0137)
Lone -0.119 0.474 0.0585 0.0448 -0.0766 -2.014*** -0.100*** 0.131***
parent (0.286) (0.301) (0.0801) (0.159) (0.216) (0.478) (0.0164) (0.0266)
Migrant 0.141 0.837*** -0.0179 -0.0878* -0.101 -0.839 -0.0222 -0.0594**
(0.219) (0.220) (0.0226) (0.0519) (0.205) (0.659) (0.0186) (0.0274)
Full -0.350** -0.848*** 0.140*** 0.396*** 0.330*** 0.513** 0.0361*** 0.136***
employment (0.140) (0.174) (0.0228) (0.0507) (0.105) (0.216) (0.00978) (0.0114)
Unemployed 0.771*** 0.834*** -0.072*** -0.118*** 0.173 0.306 0.0169** -0.103***
(0.154) (0.189) (0.0135) (0.0292) (0.131) (0.311) (0.00764) (0.0132)
Job loss 0.459*** 0.352** -0.00708 0.0368 0.310** 0.00821 0.0118 0.0286**
last year (0.165) (0.172) (0.0148) (0.0354) (0.126) (0.246) (0.00877) (0.0113)
Stroke 0.147 0.246 -0.0153 -0.0124 0.0977 0.487* 0.0125 -0.00183
(0.196) (0.235) (0.0150) (0.0360) (0.150) (0.252) (0.00851) (0.0114)
Household -0.228 0.132 0.0560 0.114 -0.00668 -0.632*** -0.00811 0.00516
change (0.171) (0.266) (0.0527) (0.103) (0.107) (0.229) (0.0126) (0.0113)
Childbirth 0.428*** 0.779*** -0.040*** -0.151*** 0.274** -1.173*** -0.042*** -0.061***
(0.149) (0.209) (0.0117) (0.0262) (0.132) (0.210) (0.0144) (0.0103)
Homeowner -0.811*** -0.584** 0.142*** 0.341***
(0.193) (0.244) (0.0365) (0.0660)
Home loan 5.250*** 3.827*** -0.314*** -0.529***
(0.220) (0.245) (0.0276) (0.0522)
Constant -0.981*** -1.933*** 0.959*** 1.293*** -3.190*** -21.48*** -0.832*** 6.457***
(0.371) (0.493) (0.0622) (0.126) (0.596) (1.372) (0.130) (0.0378)
Rho 0.676 0.581 0.557 0.589 0.672 0.944 0.579 0.748
Log
likelihood
-7,077.6 -3,308.4 -10,698.4 -6,797.9
Wald 2 1,547.17 975.39 1,361.59 1,565.39 1,106.23 600.52 1,145.86 5,607.36
Observations 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268 32,268
Households 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378 5,378
1De￿ated household income (log) 2Total monthly debt service in thousand euros. Source: SOEP: 2002￿2007.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 repetitions). * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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